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Abstract
A new 4-pass Key-Agreement-Protocol is presented. The security of the protocol
mainly relies on the existence of a (polynomial-time computable) One-Way-Function
and the supposed computational hardness of solving a specific system of equations.
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1 Introduction
At the end of a Key-Agreement-Protocol two parties, say Alice and Bob, share a common
bit string s. During the protocol they are allowed to exchange a fixed number of messages
mi, i = 1, . . . , r, over a public channel. The protocol is called secure, if no algorithm exist
that computes the string s from the mi’s in a polynomial number of steps. Whether
secure Key-Agreement-Protocols exist is still an open issue, although quite a few have
been proposed – maybe the most popular being the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol [2], where
the security is linked to the task of computing the element γab of a given cyclic group
from the elements γa and γb.
In this article, we present a new Key-Agreement-Protocol that uses four rounds of
message exchange. Its security mainly relies on the existence of a (polynomial-time
computable) One-Way-Function and the supposed computational hardness of solving a
specific system of equations.
2 The Protocol
Public data: Suppose Alice and Bob want to exchange a secret key. They start
by agreeing on a positive integer n and a prime p of size ∼ 2
√
n logn. They further
agree on a random matrix C := (ci,j)i,j ∈ Fn×np , with i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and an injective
(polynomial-time computable) One-Way-Function h : Fp −→ {0, 1}m, where Fp denotes
1
the finite field with p elements.
Private data: Next, Alice (resp. Bob) chooses a random element α ∈ Fp (resp.
β), n random bits t1, . . . , tn (resp. s1, . . . , sn) and a random permutation σ on the set
{1, . . . , n} (resp. ρ), all of which she (resp. he) keeps secret.
The computations that follow are all taking place in the finite field Fp.
First round: Alice computes for j = 1, . . . , n:
µj :=
n∑
i=1
tici,j+ σ(j)α (1)
and sends (µj)j to Bob.
Second round: Bob computes for i = 1, . . . , n:
νi :=
n∑
j=1
sjci,j+ ρ(i)β and τA :=
n∑
j=1
sjµj (2)
and sends ((νi)i, τA) to Alice.
Third round: Alice computes for k = 1, . . . , n(n−1)2 :
h(τA− kα) and τB :=
n∑
i=1
tiνi (3)
and sends ((h(τA− kα))k, τB) to Bob.
Final round: Bob computes for l = 1, . . . , n(n−1)2 the list (h(τB − lβ))l until he
finds k0 and l0, such that
h(τA− k0α) = h(τB− l0β) (4)
and sends k0 to Alice.
Alice and Bob now share a common element g := τA− k0α = τB− l0β.
3 Analysis
We start by showing the correctness of the protcol and calculate the computational cost:
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Theorem 1 After the final step both parties share a common element g. The number of
computational steps on both sides equals O(n2 · cost of evaluation of h).
Proof. The correctness of the protocol follows from the easy observation that
τA =
n∑
i,j=1
tisjci,j+ α
n∑
j=1
sjσ(j) = g
′ + αk′, (5)
and respectively
τB =
n∑
i,j=1
tisjci,j+ β
n∑
i=1
tiρ(i) = g
′ + βl′, (6)
and the fact that 1 6 k′, l′ 6 n(n − 1)/2, which means that at least one pair of integers
(k0, l0) within the given range exists, such that g := τA− k0α = τB− l0β. The number of
computational steps is also clear, since Bob can sort the list (h(τA− kα))k in O(n
2 logn)
steps, while the evaluation of the injective function h requires Ω(log p) operations. 
The above protocol gives rise to the following
Challenge 1 Given n, p, h, C, (νi)i, (µj)j, τA, τB, (h(τA− kα))k and k0, compute an
element g, such that h(g) = h(τA− k0α).
We (i.e. the author of this article) are not aware of any lower bound for the number of
steps it takes to compute the element g from Challenge 1.
In what follows, we will present an algorithm that conjecturally requires Ω(2ε
√
nlogn)
operations, for some constant ε > 0.
We will try to compute the secrect bits t1, . . . , tn of Alice. As is easily seen, the
knowledge of these bits will lead in a polynomial number of steps to the secret key. At
the beginning there is only one equation for these bits, that is
x1ν1+ . . . + xnνn = τB. (7)
Now, heuristically speaking, while there are 2n ways to select the values of the xi’s but
only p ∼ 2
√
n logn possible values for τB, there are approximately 2
n−logp ∼ 2n(1−
√
logn/n)
solutions to equation (7) (in the language of Knapsack-Cryptography, we could speak
of an ultra-high density Knapsack, since the density of this Knapsack tends to infinity [4]).
The other equations from (1) involving the ti’s can not be used immediately, since
the permutation σ and the element α are both secret, but we can try to get rid of α by
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guessing r values of the permutation σ, say σ′(1), . . . , σ′(r), which gives us r−1 additional
equations:
∑
xi(σ
′(2)ci,1− σ
′(1)ci,2) = σ
′(2)µ1− σ
′(1)µ2∑
xi(σ
′(3)ci,1− σ
′(1)ci,3) = σ
′(3)µ1− σ
′(1)µ3
...∑
xi(σ
′(r)ci,1− σ
′(1)ci,r) = σ
′(r)µ1− σ
′(1)µr.
Again, by the same heuristic argument, the system of these equations together with
equation (7) has approximately 2n−r logp ∼ 2n(1−r
√
logn/n) solutions, which means that
we can not even be sure whether our guess was right, unless n− r log p ∼ logκn, for some
constant κ.
To summarize the discussion, the probability of guessing enough equations to com-
pute the ti (where we did not even talk about the computational cost of really solving
these equations) is about n−εn/ logp ∼ 2−ε
√
nlogn, for some constant ε > 0, which is, at
least from a theoretical point of view not too far away from the probability of guessing
the secret α (resp. the secret key g) directly.
It is almost superfluous to say that these heuristic considerations do not prove
anything about the security of the stated protocol. Nevertheless, in the author’s opinion,
Challenge 1 seems worth further investigation.
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